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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper provides a brief exposition of financial markets in Post Keynesian economics. 
Inspired by John Maynard Keynes’s path-breaking insights into the role of liquidity and finance 
in “monetary production economies,” Post Keynesian economics offers a refreshing alternative 
to mainstream (mis)conceptions in this area. We highlight the importance of liquidity—as 
provided by the financial system—to the proper functioning of real world economies under 
fundamental uncertainty, contrasting starkly with the fictitious modeling world of neo-Walrasian 
exchange economies. The mainstream vision of well-behaved financial markets, channeling 
saving flows from savers to investors while anchored by fundamentals, complements a notion of 
money as an arbitrary numéraire and mere convenience, facilitating exchange but otherwise 
“neutral.” From a Post Keynesian perspective, money and finance are nonneutral but condition 
and shape real economic performance. It takes public policy to anchor asset prices and secure 
financial stability, with the central bank as the key public policy tool.  
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In mainstream economics financial markets provide the conduit through which savers channel 
their savings towards investment, permitting the economy to allocate resources to their best uses 
through time. Guiding the so-envisioned intertemporal allocation of resources, the prices of 
financial instruments determined in financial markets are held to properly reflect 
“fundamentals.” As saving finances investment, on this view, unlocking the economy’s supply-
side potential requires fully mobilizing the economy’s saving pool. As competitive markets are 
efficient, on this view, maximum productivity of the economy is best served by a quest for 
market “completeness”—the ideal of Arrow-Debreu contingent contracts spanning the whole 
space of states of nature, supposedly allowing an optimal spreading of risks. This vision of well-
behaved financial markets anchored by fundamentals complements a notion of money as an 
arbitrary numéraire and mere convenience, facilitating exchange though otherwise “neutral,” i.e., 
not determining anything “real.”  
The empirical finance literature is awash with puzzles challenging the “efficient market 
hypothesis” and related beliefs. Most important of all is the experience of recurrent financial 
crises severely disrupting real world economies, sharply contradicting any notion of financial 
markets as naturally tending towards stability and equilibrium. Yet there is remarkably little 
concern that mainstream economics may provide an altogether flawed depiction of the role of 
finance in real world economies. Financial markets are indeed at the heart of the flaw in 
neoclassical economics diagnosed by Keynes in the General Theory (Bibow 2009).  
Post Keynesian economics offers a refreshing alternative that is inspired by Keynes’s 
pathbreaking insights into the role of liquidity and finance in “monetary production economies.” 
The starting point is that “human decisions affecting the future … cannot depend on strict 
mathematical expectation, since the basis for making such calculations does not exist” (Keynes 
1978: 162–3). Especially regarding investment decisions that require a look into the faraway 
future, Keynes emphasizes that about many relevant factors there is “no scientific basis on which 
to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know” (Keynes 1987: 114; see 
also Runde 1996).  
“Fundamental (or Keynesian) uncertainty” is a critical factor considering financial 
markets (Chick 1983; Kahn 1972; Kregel 1998). The spreading of risks becomes a complicated 
matter when bankruptcy is a real possibility, but an event of unquantifiable probability. 
Specialized financiers may be willing to attach a price to “risks” of intrinsically uncertain   3
magnitude, but individual nonstandardized risks are generally nonmarketable. On the other hand, 
given the interconnectedness among economic units woven by financial markets through debt 
contracts that span over time, bankruptcies may easily spread, with contagion leading to systemic 
harm far beyond what seemed reasonable and objective estimates of individual default risks.  
It is in the presence of fundamental uncertainty that liquidity attains a special 
attractiveness by offering some degree of safety and flexibility to the individual who fears price 
volatility of alternative assets and prefers keeping options open for the time being. Liquid assets 
may, therefore, trade at a premium over alternative assets. This is despite the fact that staying 
liquid is not an option for society as a whole, since society as a whole is permanently committed 
to any real investment once it is made. The General Theory focuses on the issue of satisfying 
“liquidity preference” through financial markets and how this affects the economy in attaining 
full employment. The point is that waste of resources through underutilization results from any 
widespread urge to abstain from real investment commitments. How society chooses to deal with 
fundamental uncertainty is thus a crucial public policy matter. Financial markets may contribute 
to the spreading of risks, but coping with important uninsurable risks is an altogether different 
kind of challenge. Keynes emphasizes that public policy is crucial: “Unemployment develops, 
that is to say, because people want the moon; men cannot be employed when the object of desire 
(i.e., money) is something which cannot be produced and the demand for which cannot be 
readily chocked off. There is no remedy but to persuade the public that green cheese is 
practically the same thing and to have a green cheese factory (i.e., a central bank) under public 
control” (Keynes 1978: 235).   
As this quotation pinpoints, on a scale of liquidity, money represents “liquidity par 
excellence,” offering a fully known nominal value to its holder at any time. At the same time, it 
is the command over money and finance that equips entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial investors 
with the power to issue orders for production and investment. The contracts involved in 
recruiting labor services and obtaining the finance to pay for them are commitments to make 
future payments in terms of money, featuring money as a unit of account. The financial system 
intermediates between those who have a choice in holding their wealth in the form of money or 
other financial instruments and those who wish to acquire money in order to initiate production 
and/or the acquisition and management of assets. The financial system creates and channels the 
liquidity that is the precondition for economic activity and growth. In the fictitious exchange   4
economy of mainstream economics any commodity may serve as “numéraire” and finance 
cannot play any substantial role when expected future income is included in the budget constraint 
upon which intertemporal optimization is set to operate. By contrast, in monetary production 
economies, both the money of account function and the property of money as liquidity par 
excellence are central to the functioning of the financial system and economy at large (Pasinetti 
2007). In this twofold way, then, “the importance of money essentially flows from its being a 
link between the present and the future” (Keynes 1978: 293). Other financial assets meet 
liquidity needs to some degree.  
Regarding financial intermediation, there is an obvious attraction in being in a position to 
acquire higher-yielding assets by issuing lower-yielding liabilities, including monetary financial 
instruments that are substitutes for money issued by the sovereign. Specialized financial 
institutions may be engaged in various kinds of intermediation services aiming at profit 
maximization. In general, if unrestrained, the forces of competition and innovation may flourish, 
perhaps excessively so, in the creation, issuance, and trading of financial instruments designed to 
transfer monetary units and associated risks. Financial stability presupposes sustainable business 
models of financial intermediation and arbitrage activities. The lure of short-term profit in an 
industry that literally deals in bridging an uncertain future has produced a history of finance that 
is scattered with fraud, instability, and crises. Regulation of financial instruments and 
supervision of financial intermediaries are thus essential public policy functions.  
The private sector has largely captured the profitable business of issuing liquidity par 
excellence, supported by public safety nets. Bank deposits dominate notes and coins in the 
portfolios of the general public, with peace of mind provided by government-guaranteed deposit 
insurance. And banks themselves economize their liquidity and normally hold deposits at the 
central bank only at whatever minimum may be required of them, assured that systemic liquidity 
is underwritten by the central bank as “lender of last resort.” As a “dealer in money and debts” 
(Keynes 1978: 205), the central bank has the power to swiftly adapt the size and composition of 
its balance sheet. Extending the scope of debt-management techniques as applied to the public 
debt, typically providing an important collateral asset and the benchmark against which private 
risks are priced, monetary policy represents the most powerful public tool for applying 
immediate influence over financial conditions (Goodhart 1995).    5
Under normal conditions monetary policy consists of setting the short-term rate of 
interest, the price rather than the quantity of base money, and an important price for the financial 
system indeed, strongly influencing the profitability of financial intermediation in particular 
(Dow 1997). While the “short-term rate of interest is easily controlled by the monetary 
authority” (Keynes 1978: 203), the challenge of monetary policy lies in guiding financial 
conditions more generally, and in a way that is conducive to achieving the goals of public policy. 
As an example, Keynes uses open market operations to illustrate the role of expectations and 
market conventions in determining longer-term interest rates. In practice, the interaction between 
the central bank and financial market players is a longstanding, two-way, and rather complex 
one—making monetary policy an art as well as a science. With monetary policy tactics 
employing both words and deeds, Keynes stresses the pivotal role of banks, which, in his view, 
“in general … hold the key position in the transition from a lower to a higher level of activity” 
(Keynes 1987: 222). Banks (perhaps also operating as “shadow banks” if the authorities allow) 
can create the liquidity that the real economy requires to function and grow.  
To pinpoint the flaw that Keynes identified in the “classical” system, and to illuminate 
how Post Keynesian and mainstream perspectives differ, note here that the determination of 
“the” rate of interest (rather: financial conditions) has nothing to do with equilibrium in some 
imaginary “capital market” balancing saving and investment flows. Instead, the rate of interest is 
determined by portfolio equilibrium in asset markets at any given short-term policy rate: at 
current prices all existing marketable financial instruments are willingly held, with a given pool 
of liquidity—as provided by the banking system—supporting interest rates and asset prices at 
their current levels. While the outcome at any given time reflects the interaction between the 
monetary authorities and financial market players, there is no direct and immediate way in which 
“fundamentals” may find their supposedly uniquely correct expression in asset prices. Under 
Keynesian uncertainty the idea of uniquely correct asset prices determined by fundamentals is 
philosophically fallacious. Tomorrow’s realities supposedly reflected in uniquely correct asset 
prices today are yet to be determined. The point is that financial markets—however guided—are 
a real factor in shaping tomorrow’s realities, not by channeling saving flows arising from given 
incomes though, but by creating and channeling liquidity, thereby determining national income 
and employment.    6
In short, money and finance condition the real economy, not the other way round. It is the 
financial system that grants, or declines, the command over the money units needed to meet 
money contracts. The price at which it does so is the money rate of interest—accordingly 
described by Keynes (1978: 223) as “ruling the roost” in setting the pace of capital accumulation 
and economic activity. While regular cash flows from the circular flow of production and 
spending may seem to keep the channels filled, this overlooks the fact that dated debts need to be 
rolled over, giving lenders the option to deny finance at their discretion. Reference to the 
prominence of retained earnings over external sources in financing corporate investment misses 
the point that fresh external finance is vital in sponsoring growth in spending, growth upon 
which the well-functioning of capitalism appears to depend. If growth is driven by corporate 
investment, the corporate sector can be expected to be in continuous need of fresh external 
finance: the situation that Keynes took for granted. Alternatively, apart from public “deficit 
spending,” more temporary growth stimuli can also arise from positive trade balances and 
household sector credit-financed spending, with financial markets catering for correspondingly 
different needs in each case. 
Under Keynesian uncertainty public policy is vital in anchoring financial markets. When 
let off the hook, endogenous processes of credit creation and asset market play may easily feed 
bubbles and lead to financial fragility, intrinsically entwined with powerful real economy 
feedback loops (Minsky 2008). Liquid financial markets serve both individual and social 
purposes, but the “fetish of liquidity” may also generate overtrading and underinvestment. 
Keynes knew from intimate experience that “markets can remain irrational for longer than you or 
I can remain solvent” (attributed) and that professionals may find it safer to anticipate “what 
average opinion expects the average opinion to be,” rather than try to “defeat the dark forces of 
time and ignorance” (Keynes 1978: 155–6). Warning that “when the capital development of a 
country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done” 
(Keynes 1978: 159), he also suggested that the dynamism of monetary production economies 
depends on entrepreneurial animal spirits meeting some corresponding support from 
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